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1. Introduction 
2015 has shaken the EU to its core. Hard upon the 
heels of geopolitical upheavals in Ukraine, as well as in-
ternal battles to define both Eurozone and energy gov-
ernance, the refugee crisis has prompted a sober reck-
oning of the EU’s competence and its humanity. With 
an increasing number of articles and Special Issues in 
Politics and Governance focusing upon key aspects of 
the EU as both a political actor, and a source of gov-
ernance, our autumn 2015 editorial looks briefly at the 
significance of the refugee crisis in the context of the 
EU’s current response and future options.  
It is difficult to write dispassionately about crises. 
Crises prompt anxiety about their cause, alarm about 
their impact and ongoing unease about an appropriate 
policy response. In responding to a crisis, the term ‘pol-
icy’ suggests a measured, synthesizing stance brought 
effectively to bear upon the salient parts of a given 
problem. Championed by a given political actor, and 
operationalised as a form of governance, policy re-
sponses have the potential to be focused, swift, target-
ed and effective. If only it were so easy in practice.  
Political responses to the crises within the Union 
have accordingly been largely crafted on national, ra-
ther than Union perspectives. British PM David Camer-
on for instance viewed the issue through the lenses of 
unemployed migrants and alleged claimant abuses 
within the British welfare system. His French and Ger-
man counterparts meanwhile responded on the basis 
of their traditional view of EU and non-EU immigrants 
as overall net contributors to the welfare system, and 
ultimately a cultural positive. Even starker contrasts 
were witnessed as the crisis wore on. In his State of the 
Union speech, European Commission President Jean-
Claude Juncker argued that the vast majority of the 
500,000 refugees heading to Europe were ‘fleeing from 
war in Syria, the terror of the Islamic State in Libya or 
dictatorship in Eritrea’, targeting Greece, Hungary and 
Italy (Juncker, 2015). In contrast to the razorwire-
inspired, proto-patriotic response of Hungarian Presi-
dent Viktor Orban, replete with alarmist imagery of mi-
grants breaking down the doors of Europe, Juncker ar-
gued credibly that it was ‘time for bold, determined 
and concerted action by the European Union, by its in-
stitutions and by all its Member States.’ Juncker’s ar-
gument was clear enough. Despite having become a 
victim of its own success, the Nobel-prize winning EU 
needs to rethink the practical implications of operating 
as a normative, ethical power. Juncker’s words are 
worth revisiting at some length:  
This is first of all a matter of humanity and of hu-
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man dignity. And for Europe it is also a matter of his-
torical fairness. We Europeans should remember well 
that Europe is a continent where nearly everyone has 
at one time been a refugee. Our common history is 
marked by millions of Europeans fleeing from religious 
or political persecution, from war, dictatorship, or op-
pression….Have we really forgotten that after the dev-
astation of the Second World War, 60 million people 
were refugees in Europe? That as a result of this terri-
ble European experience, a global protection regime—
the 1951 Geneva Convention on the status of refu-
gees—was established to grant refuge to those who 
jumped the walls in Europe to escape from war and to-
talitarian oppression?….Yet, in spite of our fragility, our 
self-perceived weaknesses, today it is Europe that is 
sought as a place of refuge and exile. It is Europe today 
that represents a beacon of hope, a haven of stability 
in the eyes of women and men in the Middle East and 
in Africa. That is something to be proud of and not 
something to fear. (Juncker, 2015, italics added) 
Here too, imagery is key, largely because of the cat-
egories that arise in attempting to bring order to a cri-
sis, and which subsequently play a key mode in con-
structing policy responses. Refugees and ‘genuine’ 
asylum-seekers from visibly volatile states inhabit one 
end of the ‘refugee crisis’ while demographic and mar-
ket imbalances producing economic migrants have cre-
ated the ‘migration crisis’. The former are to be afford-
ed protection because the arbitrary and violent nature 
of their home states cannot. The latter, at the mercy of 
general economic disparities rather than outright per-
secution, cannot - at least in multitudinous form - yet 
be guaranteed entry, or possibly even assistance. To 
some, these are specious distinctions; to others, the 
basis for an emergent if piecemeal European Agenda 
on Migration. This Agenda, on the basis of the Europe-
an Commission’s Second Implementation Package pro-
poses—inter alia—a new crisis relocation mechanism, 
additional funding, reception centres, and amending a 
2013 regulation ‘establishing the criteria and mecha-
nisms for determining the Member State responsible 
for examining an application for international protec-
tion lodged in one of the Member States by a third 
country national or a stateless person’ (European Eco-
nomic and Social Committee, 2015). 
Is this good enough? Indeed, it is quite simply: 
enough? Observing the lack of agreement amongst EU 
member states, the inaction of the European Union it-
self, and the increasingly negative tone of political de-
bates in various national media against refugees and 
migrants alike, one must ask what form current and fu-
ture refugee crises will take, the nature of the demo-
graphic volatilities that give rise to them, and critically, 
the legal and ethical responsibilities of the EU. At a 
basic level, the migration crisis is no different from the 
myriad policy challenges that have arisen in the past 
few years; i.e. it illustrates once again the EU’s limita-
tions to jointly perceive problems in common and re-
spond collectively. Problems in recognizing the intrinsic 
limits of ‘Europe’ and the necessity for a Union-wide 
response occur when the most sensitive aspects of 
Member States are at stake: their sovereignty, their 
borders, and their identity. For better or worse, migra-
tion challenges EU Member States to act as a group, 
generating zero-sum responses about their quantita-
tive ability to economically support migrations, and ex-
clusivist logic about their qualitative power to socially 
integrate migrants, regardless of their economic or asy-
lum-based needs.  
The EU’s obligations are better understood by ap-
preciating the complications of its own neighbourhood. 
Externally, the migration of entire communities toward 
Europe is traceable to roughly half a dozen key sources: 
(1) ongoing post-Arab Spring volatilities in North Africa; 
(2) the current failed state of post-intervention Libya; 
(3) the political and environmental consequences of 
Sahel-based fundamentalism upon North and East Afri-
ca; (4) the ongoing upheavals of the Middle East; (5) 
uneven post-conflict settlement in Afghanistan; (6) the 
impact of the Syrian civil war; and (6) recent ISIS incur-
sions into Syria and Iraq. Much of this volatility pre-
dates the EU’s own foreign policy structure, outflanks 
its limited strategic depth and is attributable to Ameri-
can and coalition-based incursions that have been 
more than a decade in the making. However, the de-
mographic outcomes are increasingly and materially 
felt by the EU alone.  
The 2015 EU Strategic Review, entitled The Europe-
an Union in a changing global environment: A more 
connected, contested and complex world (forming part 
of the 2016 Global Strategy composed by the High Rep-
resentative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Fed-
erica Mogherini) acknowledges that Europe’s challeng-
ing global environment, in which ‘fragile states and 
ungoverned spaces’ have produced suffering, ‘instabil-
ity and violence…poverty, lawlessness, corruption and 
conflict-ridden electoral politics’ resulting in the dis-
placement of 50 million people (European External Ac-
tion Service, 2015). 
As described by the Strategic Review, the contrast 
between war-torn regions and the relative safety of the 
EU could not be more stark. The European Union has 
transformed from being merely alluringly hearth-like 
for economic migrants to the only remaining safe ha-
ven within reach for political refugees. Regardless of 
the cause, migrants collectively leave homes, property, 
livelihoods and family to undertake the grim risks asso-
ciated with trafficking across both land and sea, and 
the ensuing vulnerability of fending for themselves up-
on arrival in an EU Member State. Those who survive 
then enter both a legal purgatory, and the absurdity of 
Europe’s charitable resentment.  
The fallout of Europe’s neighbourhood, and the col-
lateral damage in human terms has been a clear trend 
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for the better part of five years; clear enough for key 
EU policy documents to identify it. Yet this summer, 
Europe delayed. Abstained. Waited. For death tolls to 
rise; for collective tragedies to break upon European 
shores; for localized dramas between the UK and 
France to herald a wider pressure against southern and 
central eastern states. From within and without, EU 
policy on migration appeared inadmissibly tardy and 
inexcusably inhumane. In the plaintive tones of the 
New York Times: ‘It may seem quaint to recall the Eu-
ropean Union’s ideals; it is also necessary to its surviv-
al. Where is the statesman’s voice that rises above the 
pusillanimous chorus of petty calculation and self-
regard?’ (Cohen, 2015). Only German’s Chancellor 
Merkel appeared to grasp the humanity amidst the se-
verity, the grief amidst the gravity. The European Un-
ion ‘does not have the luxury of turning inwards’, as-
serts the 2015 Strategic Review, and yet the EU still 
divides its perspective between ‘a responsibility to pro-
tect our citizens’ and a need to promote ‘our interest 
and universal values’ which, alongside European pros-
perity, are precisely the magnets transforming Europe 
into the sole safe haven for hundreds of thousands (Eu-
ropean External Action Service, 2015). 
What the 2015 Strategic Review suggests, and what 
Juncker asserted is roughly one and the same. Europe’s 
heritage seems firmly established, yet its present hu-
manity is in doubt. From a legal perspective, a key 
source of this rupture is the translation of essentially 
ethnocentric norms of human rights, rule of law, de-
mocracy and good governance into operable standards 
of behavior, specifically within Europe’s own neighbour-
hood. Despite the soft power attraction inherent in en-
largement, and the attempts by its lacklustre successor, 
the European Neighbourhood Policy, EU norms have 
ironically proved robust enough to help source post-war 
international law, but not attractive enough to trans-
form the political outlook of its neighbourhood. Rather 
than the ring of ‘well governed countries’ that Javier 
Solana espoused in the 2003 European Security Strategy, 
post-enlargement regional upheavals in North Africa, 
the Middle East and Eastern Europe have thwarted both 
bilateral and multilateral attempts by the EU to establish 
a settled neighborhood on the principle of ‘enlargement 
lite’. Instead of strategies to reduce conflict and mitigate 
insecurity, neither the ENP nor its core value-set have 
worked to transform any of the neighbourhood states, 
at least according to the ENP’s initial template of gov-
ernance. Instead, a combination of cultural specificity 
preventing a common interpretation of those norms, 
and national and fundamental upsurges inhibiting their 
implementation has marked the entire region.  
For those who see the ENP as a form of remote-
control foreign policy designed to prevent volatility and 
migratory shockwaves from spreading, then European 
humanity came instrumentally adrift from its heritage 
the moment the policy was launched. For those who 
regarded the ENP as a long-term, incentive-driven form 
of variable integration, the norms designed to level the 
political, economic and civil society playing fields eroded 
more slowly, seeping away with each iteration that trans-
formed itself, rather than its neighbours, from the princi-
ple of ‘more for more’ to a guarantee of ‘less for less’.  
Civilizationally, the ethical responsibility of the EU is 
to move from its Westphalian heritage to spreading the 
lessons of both World Wars. This requires transforming 
communitarian structures in which national communi-
ties remain purely coextensive with their borders, and 
retain exclusivist policy attitudes to cosmopolitan 
structures in which the ethical significance of key 
norms strikes a balance with state autonomy internally 
and externally condone general standards of justice, 
fairness and moral reasonableness. The transcendence 
of political statism through normative community, in 
other words. By dint of institutional, legal, economic 
and political integration, many aspects of EU govern-
ance have now transformed statist perspectives to 
cosmopolitan structures. We have also seen slow but 
perceptible shifts from exclusivist interpretations of 
sovereignty to the establishment of international socie-
ty upon the basis of law, the maintenance and pursuit 
of peace and the common goals of a social life: the cen-
tral elements identified by international relations 
scholar Hedley Bull (1977) regarding the morality of 
contemporary states. From this perspective, despite 
the EU’s failure to support key neighbourhood states or 
support their societies during post-war turbulence, the 
EU has an established record in terms of uploading its 
normative heritage to the international level, both as a 
key member of the international community, and as a 
central player in the construction of key aspects of 
post-war international law. The EU is therefore identi-
fied and indeed appreciated as a normative actor, with 
a strong reputation for supporting key values, specifi-
cally democracy and human rights. The difficulty of 
course is how to go beyond the technical, diplomatic 
economic support of values, and construct policies that 
actually establish rather than espouse value-based re-
forms. Human rights, for instance remains the respon-
sibility of every state as confirmed by the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 
(ICISS), which from 2001 has promulgated the principle 
of state-led humanitarian intervention and democracy 
restoration known as the ‘responsibility to protect’ 
(Council on Foreign Relations, 2001). 
In this respect, the problem for the EU (as for other 
cosmopolitan actors) is the observance and enforce-
ment of human rights in the face of breaches. As sug-
gested in the Commission’s report on The Responsibil-
ity to Protect (International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001), enforce-
ment is itself a right, particularly where breaches entail 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, crimes of aggres-
sion, and the crime of genocide. While the ability, and 
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indeed the ex ante responsibility to prevent such 
crimes has yet to be established beyond episodic modes 
of international behavior, the ex post responsibility to af-
ford a duty of care to those affected by way of post-
conflict protection and reconstruction remains ironically 
both opaque and obligatory. Such responsibilities are es-
sential, whether intervention has destroyed infrastruc-
ture and livelihoods, or whether the complete absence 
of assistance has forced countless communities to relo-
cate. The irony is that for the EU, while norms are deeply 
embedded (if somewhat unevenly upheld) in its domes-
tic makeup, the humanitarian obligations that flow from 
the observance of these same norms in its neighbour-
hood contexts are not yet evenly implemented. 
Is this simply because the neighbourhood remains 
fundamentally outside, quintessentially beyond the EU, 
rather than a fundamental part of the context by which 
the Union is at once constructed and in the process of 
constructing? A neighbourhood that is associated with 
the Union, but not yet of Europe, and consequently en-
tailing differential, but fundamentally different treat-
ment? While its intervention in the Balkans is largely a 
positive story of post-conflict reconstruction and sup-
port, EU assistance in states that have for more than a 
decade fallen within strategic contours of its own Eu-
ropean Neighbourhood Policy has been lackluster at 
best and non-existent at worst. Georgia and Ukraine in 
the east, Lebanon and Syria in the Middle East, Libya 
and Egypt in North Africa all exemplify areas where the 
EU, and other key powers have simply defaulted in 
their responsibility to protect and rebuild. Bottom-up, 
civil society-based resilience remains preferable to top-
down political support (or resistance), the prevalent 
strategy being to keep out of conflicts and supporting 
foreign policy protagonists at arm’s length (e.g. Pales-
tine, the Kurds, much of the Ukraine and the majority 
of civil society in ENP states).  
The problem with this approach is twofold. First, 
one abdicates responsibility for tackling the proximate 
problem directly. True, the appetite and political will to 
bring an antagonist to ground is frequently in abey-
ance. The consequences for failing to do so however, 
are anything but: protracted inaction permit state-
based tyrannies to operate with impunity, while re-
pressive non-state regimes like ISIS to expand their 
reach rapaciously. Second, in abjuring responsibility to 
tackle (or even to unequivocally name) the initial cause 
of a conflict, it is alarmingly easy to then neglect the 
remote, ex post consequences of affording protection 
to the human communities living within, or shifting 
desperately to avoid a given conflict. Having deflected 
the responsibility to engage in any significant way (or in 
any particular geopolitical combination), with much of 
the above-mentioned causes of neighborhood upheav-
al, Europe is now experiencing the consequences of 
precisely this omission in the form of massive refugee 
flows. The second omission, that of failing to fulfill even 
a basic responsibility to protect societies within those 
countries most at risk of demographic upheaval has 
this summer led to a third infraction: neglecting to af-
ford a collective duty of care to the refugees fleeing as 
a direct response of inaction and lack of assistance by 
key global actors, including the EU. In instances where 
return is impossible, either in the short or long term, 
the responsibility to rebuild must at a minimum be re-
placed by the responsibility to receive, preferably as an 
accepted component of EU foreign policy if not as a 
principle of international law.  
While moral rightness and legality remain on differ-
ent footings, the majority of national legislation, includ-
ing the EU’s proposed migration mechanisms fall far 
short of their ethical responsibilities. To remedy such 
problems, the legal philosopher, Gustaf Radbruch, has 
suggested that preference be ‘given to the positive law, 
duly and secured by state power as it is, even when it is 
unjust and of no benefit to the people, unless its con-
flict with justice reaches so intolerable a level that the 
statute becomes, in effect, ‘false law’ and must there-
fore yield to justice (Radbruch, 1946; Radbruch as cited 
in Paulson, 1995). Within the context of the refugee cri-
sis, one may well conclude that the EU, and its Member 
States are facing precisely this challenge: injustice and 
human suffering are indeed reaching intolerable levels, 
thus the present legal corpus must somehow yield to the 
principled and justiciable needs of humanity. 
In terms of immediate policy change, as well as fu-
ture types of governance, the ENP is surely in need of 
radical overhaul if it is to guarantee the continuity of 
EU stability internally, and neighbourhood security ex-
ternally. The ENP remains the most paradoxical of all EU 
foreign policies: designed to domestic its foreign neigh-
bourhood precisely by denying the domesticating influ-
ence of full accession; the promise of EU partnership but 
based on the partner’s own promises. Having signally 
failed to make good the principle of neighbour, partner 
or even associate, the EU is being forced to internalize 
the external pressure of refugees and migrants in both 
practical and cultural terms. The ENP however was not 
designed as a regional preventative but rather an incen-
tive-driven package. Despite this, while much local and 
regional upheaval could not have been prevented, its 
causes, and certainly its effects in societal terms, could 
have been predicted. Even its most recent appraisal 
acknowledges that the ‘ENP has not always been able to 
offer adequate responses to these recent developments, 
nor to the changing aspirations of our partners. There-
fore, the EU’s own interests have not been fully served 
either’ (High Representative of the European Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policies, 2015). 
What is therefore crucial for the political actor of 
the EU, and its subsequent governance of the neigh-
bourhood, is that the next overhaul of the ENP is (1) 
clear from the outset about the migratory shifts that 
will become a staple of Europe’s neighbourhood for 
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decades to come; (2) offer rationalized Union-based 
support to refugees in transit and upon arrival of all 
stripes; and (3) targeted responses based on the re-
sponsibility to protect and rebuild in the absence of, 
but preferably in counterpart with substantive political 
interventions. European leaders have so far failed to 
recognize, in the words of the late Tony Judt, ‘how 
much change was needed if you wished to keep the 
important things as they were’; the challenge therefore 
being to strike a balance between the possible and the 
necessary (Judt & Snyder, p. 7). Some acknowledgment 
of the possible tools needed to ensure the necessary 
result is found in the above-mentioned Strategic Re-
view, in which ‘redoubling commitment to our Europe-
an neighbours’ provides a range of options, all bent on 
promoting structural economic and positive political 
reform ‘through credible policies of integration and as-
sociation’ (European External Action Service, 2015). 
The next step however is to ensure that the sugges-
tions in this report, and those in the 2016 EU Global 
Strategy obtain materially as policy tools that are prac-
tical to deploy and efficient to run in ENP partner 
states, specifically in terms of conflict resolution, and 
cross-border migratory issues.  
Failing to do so will not only deepen the refugee 
crisis, it will relegate the ENP from being merely dis-
credited to emphatically deceased. If humanity is to ac-
tively determine the nature of European governance, 
rather than passively reflecting its heritage, then 
Juncker’s State of the Union admonition is crucial: ‘We 
Europeans should know and should never forget why 
giving refuge and complying with the fundamental 
right to asylum is so important. I have said in the past 
that we are too seldom proud of our European herit-
age and our European project’ (Juncker, 2015). While 
for many, the EU remains ‘the dullest miracle on earth’, 
it is also the single greatest achievement of one of the 
most war-torn centuries in human history (Cohen, 
2015). In advancing a migratory policy that is both ethi-
cal and utilitarian, the EU now needs to realign its in-
ternal odyssey with its regional destiny. 
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